EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLANNING

WAIMAKIRIRI DISTRICT COUNCIL

RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PLANNING LESSONS

FROM THE CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKES OF 2010 & 2011

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2011

Kellogg Leadership Programme

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INTRODUCTION

At 4.35am on 4th September 2010, Canterbury was hit by an earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale. On 22nd February 2011 and 13th June 2011 a separate fault line approximately 35km from the first, ruptured to inflict two further earthquakes measuring 6.3 and 6.0 respectively. As a direct result of the February earthquake, 181 people lost their lives. Some commentators have described this series of earthquakes as the most expensive global insurance event of all time.

These earthquakes and the more than 7000 associated aftershocks have had a significant physical impact on parts of Canterbury and virtually none on others. The economic, social and emotional impacts of these quakes spread across Canterbury and beyond.

Waimakariri district, north of Christchurch, has reflected a similar pattern, with over 1400 houses requiring rebuild or substantial repair, millions of dollars of damage to infrastructure, and significant social issues as a result. The physical damage in Waimakiriri District was predominately in parts of Kaiapoi, and two small beach settlements, The Pines and Kairaki Beach with pockets elsewhere in the district. While the balance of the district is largely physically untouched, the economic, social, and emotional shockwaves have spread across the district. Waimakariri district consists of two main towns, Rangiora and Kaiapoi, a number of smaller urban areas and a larger rural area. It is considered mid-size in the New Zealand local government landscape.

This paper will explore the actions and plans of Waimakiriri District Council (WDC) in the Emergency Management Recovery programme to provide context to allow a more detailed examination of the planning processes prior to, and subsequent to the earthquakes. This study looked at documentation produced by WDC, applicable legislation and New Zealand Emergency Management resources and other sources. Key managers and elected representatives in the WDC were interviewed, along with a selection of governmental and non-governmental agency representatives. The interview responses enable understanding of how central Government and other local authorities can benefit from these lessons and apply them to their own planning.

It is intended that this paper will assist local government organisations in New Zealand to evaluate their planning processes in light of the events of 2010/11 in Canterbury and the lessons from WDC.

NZ has a very strong Emergency Management planning framework. This is laid out in the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 that replaced the Civil Defence Act 1983. With this change, there was a significant move of emphasis from Civil Defence to holistic Emergency Management. This shift in thinking in the 2002 Act has not flowed through in practice.

The new Act:

- promotes sustainable management of hazards
- encourages and enables communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk
- provides for planning and preparation for emergencies, and for Response and Recovery
- requires local authorities to coordinate planning and activities
- provides a basis for the integration of national and local Civil Defence
- encourages Emergency Management coordination across a wide range of agencies, recognising that emergencies are multi-agency events.

The four key stages (4Rs) of the Emergency Management lifecycle, as detailed further in this document, in summary are:

- Reduction – Risk identification and management of possible hazards through the district plan
- Readiness – Planning and capability building
- Response – The immediate actions following an event
- Recovery – Transition processes from a state of emergency to business as usual

The primary goal for communities is to be self-reliant. Communities should aim to reduce the likely impact from, prepare for, and be able to respond effectively to, emergency events on their own. To encourage this, regional cooperation and coordination are paramount and form one of the cornerstones of the Act.

WDC, as required under the Act, has worked in conjunction with the Group Civil Defence, which covers Timaru to Kaikoura, to prepare and plan for emergencies. It is apparent that the preparation and planning has been focussed on the Response phase of the Emergency Management lifecycle and not so much on the Recovery phase. Investigation suggests this is very common throughout New Zealand. Despite many emergencies in New Zealand's recent history, until the 2005 landslides in Matata in the Bay of Plenty, no emergency had gone through

a lifecycle that had ever required any detailed planned Recovery process since the Act came into force in 2002. The emergency had tended to go from Response to business as usual with no or very low-level Recovery efforts. Therefore, the Recovery plan may only ever have been a compliance activity rather than a practical working document. This was certainly the case for WDC.

The other element that has become apparent is the physical Response and Recovery execution is far easier to plan and execute than the social Response and Recovery. The social Response and Recovery however has very strong links to the physical Response and Recovery. The physical elements prove capability and confidence in the capability to deliver on the longer term social elements. As Rob Kerr (WDC Infrastructure Recovery Manager) said *'Repairing sewers not only addresses the physical services needs of the community, it more importantly builds the communities confidence in the future of our community.'* This mantra has been a recurring theme throughout the Response and Recovery planning. Jim Palmer (WDC CEO) set the scene very early on in the process by publicly stating in October 2010 *'we will be measured on how the people get through this, not the kilometres of new roading, sewer or water pipe.'*

The recurring theme throughout this study has been the leadership within the WDC. This view is expressed by a number of researchers and commentators. As the Future Canterbury Network stated in its assessment of WDC performance:

> *'The evidence is clear that leadership performance of elected Council leaders and Waimakariri staff has been significantly ahead of community expectations. A frequent refrain is that Council leaders have shown character and courage in times of great stress and that their sympathy and empathy for the plight of those most affected has shone through at all times.*
>
> *In particular, the community and Future Canterbury Network assessors scored WDC as achieving exceptional performance in those dimensions, which focused on meeting the needs of people, and effective communications that maintained a sense of momentum and making positive progress.*
>
> *It also needs to be said that the size and nature of the District and thence its organisational structure has meant WDC has not been confronted by the same intensity and issues of leadership which will influence a larger entity.'*

The documentation from WDC shows very high levels of communication that focuses on the community at the centre of this Recovery. Certainly my personal experience, as a resident in the Waimakariri District, reinforces the refrain *'Ui mai koe ki ahau he aha te mea nui o te ao, Maku e*

ki atu he tangata, he tangata, he tangata!' (Ask me what is the greatest thing in the world, I will reply: It is people, it is people, it is people!) holds very true in the Response and Recovery phases of this Emergency Management process.

While WDC had a formal Recovery Plan in place, this has not been used as a primary recovery tool by WDC. In fact, senior staff members were not aware of its existence. This document was created in conjunction with the other councils in the regional group Civil Defence and is virtually identical to the plans at the Timaru, Ashburton, Selwyn, Hurunui, Christchurch and Kaikoura Councils.

One of the major challenges for WDC is the separation of Recovery from the Response. This requires a 'handover' mentality when in reality, Emergency Response Best Practice calls for a single organisation managing both and so this is a phase change on each work stream and consequently in a worst-case demands that all Response is completed before any Recovery can start. The planning needs to recognise that multiple streams will have various transition points and so there is no handover from the 'Response' team to the 'Recovery' team. This separation is common, however; the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management who have the support of legislation to lead this, have been constrained from delivering on this by the intervention of the Honourable Gerry Brownlie (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Minister). Clearly, these Emergency Management frameworks are misunderstood by large numbers of New Zealanders, from the public, to Councillors, to Members of Parliament.

WDC was severely impacted by a change of direction imposed upon it by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA). The council had set up a substantial set of work streams that were to cover the removal of houses, remediation of land, remediation of infrastructure and community recovery; all underpinned by communication plans that ensured the community stayed well informed of the plans. This time phased three-year plan was in the early stages of implementation when the council was advised to halt all work, with no reason given, on the 13th June 2011. Two weeks later, and two hours before the media and public were informed, the council was told by Gerry Brownlie, Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Minister, that over 60 houses were to be designated red zone, meaning they could not be rebuilt where they were. A substantial further number were designated orange meaning their future was uncertain. Over 900 of these homes were subsequently zoned red a few weeks later. This will force this land to be set aside until the final land use is determined in the years to come. The immediate plans are to clear the land of buildings, fences, plantings and infrastructure and sow with grass. The changes, made meant that no amount of prior planning could have predicted

this significant change. The consequence of this is the mantra and brand of confidence and certainty that had been well developed, has been severely damaged by decisions outside the WDC sphere of influence. WDC had become a trusted advisor to its communities. That trust and confidence is very vulnerable – particularly to the impacts of decisions made by external agencies.

While Response planning needs to be detailed in terms of the local arrangements for the very early stages of Emergency Management, detailed Recovery planning is fraught with challenges and uncertainty. My conclusion is it is better to build:

- A framework of plans covering key areas such as housing, lifelines (phone, power, water, sewers etc.), social wellbeing needs, health provision and very importantly communications
- A culture of strong leadership and cooperation coupled with people capabilities, and
- A set of Recovery local arrangements established, in the same manner that planned Response local arrangements, should be a part of the planning framework

I have two recommendations for WDC that cover:

- Civil Defence Capability Assessment Tool
- A holistic approach to Emergency Management
- Definition of the governance roles in relation to Emergency Management

METHODOLOGY

Interviews and reviews of documentation are the two primary methods of data gathering.

INTERVIEWS

Formal scripted interviews of a number of key managers and a selection of elected representatives in WDC have been conducted and the results compiled to give an understanding of the perceptions of the interview subjects and their view of planning effectiveness in times of disaster.

A selection of governmental and non-governmental agency representatives have been interviewed to gain their perception of role of the organisation they represent in planning and in particular how they support local government in this and their expectations and requirements of local government .

A series of structured and unstructured interviews were conducted. The purpose of these interviews is to gain insight into not only the processes undertaken but also the perceptions of the interview subjects of the efficacy of the processes.

INTERVIEW SUBJECTS

WDC Staff & Management

> Jim Palmer – CEO
>
> Simon Markham – Manager Policy and Customer Service/Recovery Manager
>
> Rob Kerr – Former Infrastructure Recovery Manager
>
> Sandra James – Social Services Recovery Manager
>
> Nick Harrison – Manager, Planning & Regulation
>
> Brennan Wiremu – Emergency Management and Civil Defence Officer
>
> Alicia Palmer – Emergency Management Officer
>
> Les Pester – Environmental Services Manager & Former Emergency Management Officer

WDC Elected Representatives

David Ayers — Mayor

Roger Blair — Councillor (Council Portfolio — Regulatory Functions and Civil Defence)

Peter Allen — Councillor (Council Portfolio — Community Development)

Members of Parliament

Hon. Kate Wilkinson — List MP Minister of the Crown based in Waimakariri

Hon. Clayton Cosgrove — Electoral Member for Waimakariri Labour Party

Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Agency (CERA)

Michelle Mitchell — General Manager, Community Wellbeing (former Regional Commissioner for Social Development)

Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management

John Hamilton — National Controller

Canterbury Group Civil Defence

John Mitchell — Group Controller

INTERVIEW TEMPLATE

All interviews were conducted using a guide for the different audiences:

The key questions covered:
- key documents
- value proposition
- conflicts in resources/responsibilities
- what was good or not
- what was critical or not

Additional questions were added on governance for elected representatives, and as an observer for supporting agencies.

DOCUMENTATION REVIEW

The following documentation has been reviewed to establish the formality of planning, then gauge the efficacy of this planning, and determine any influencing documentation, in particular Acts of Parliament.

- A review of the following WDC planning documentation has been undertaken.
  - Pre-earthquake planning
  - Post-earthquake planning documentation from the period following the September 2010 and subsequent major quakes
- Legislation that influences or impacts on disaster planning to better understand the legislative requirements
- Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management documentation
- Future Canterbury Network assessment of WDC
- Other documentation that is relevant

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW FINDINGS

WAIMAKARIRI DISTRICT COUNCIL

COUNCIL OFFICERS

During these interviews, a number of recurring themes came out. WDC personnel have undertaken some self-assessment of the processes to date, and some of the key success factors recognised by them that have come out in discussions, or other documents, are discussed below.

Remain centred at all times on the affected community. While this seems a statement of the obvious, to be cognisant of, and empathetic with those experiencing the disaster first hand, experience shows that over time the focus can very easily shift onto processes, and activities that, while important from agency viewpoints do not materially assist the Recovery. Assess proposals for prioritising work towards the things that will count for the community, both short and longer term.

Maintaining a Social and Economic Recovery focus is vital. Usually, resources will be found to repair and restore infrastructure, but the more difficult to assess, fund and action, and ultimately enduring issues are in the social and economic areas. The role of agencies can be less clear-cut, the effects harder to evaluate and the Recovery time longer, and can be a second catastrophic experience for affected community members. From a planning perspective, this must be the first cab off the rank, as this focus will then ensure planning decisions related to the community have a high profile.

Maintain a sense of urgency. After the huge effort of Response, it is too easy to lapse back into bureaucratic processes and timeframes. This may be acceptable for normal business but the loss of momentum protracts the Recovery - it is not a matter of speed at all costs, but setting 'soft' timeframes can condition agencies to accepting processes and programmes measured in

years that do not need to be that long through focus, smart planning and effective collaboration. All plans need to ensure that alacrity and agility are built in as things change.

Target integrated delivery across the whole of government. There is a natural tendency to lapse back into silos and 'business as usual'. The Response and initial Recovery however provide focus for the need to work quickly and collaboratively. Seek to maintain that approach. Successful, speedy return to any norms requires 'business as unusual'. At times, there was a distinct lack of leadership fostering external collaboration. A key criticism of government agencies was the ability to engage with the needy who had never been needy before. The Ministry of Social Development is set up to be Welfare Driven not Community Driven. This is a crucial but subtle difference.

Leadership in a shared vision and strategy is vital. The future focus described as a vision for the target in restoration and improvement in outcome, not just process terms is vital. Too often Recovery becomes a 'to do' list that lacks a central premise that can and is shared. The underlying theme from all of the interviewees was the respect and admiration that they have for Jim Palmer and David Ayers. There is a case study to be written here on the culture development that has taken place at WDC.

All programmes must be specific. They must include integrated and time bound programmes of rebuild or retreat activities and works with targets that are location specific. This must convey the intended timeframes by which either community restoration or relocation is intended to happen in that area. Programmes should be responsive to changing circumstances and able to be referenced back to baselines and overall goals.

Local community engagement is crucial. True engagement and involvement in Recovery planning and delivery is understood, or should be. This is not 'just' communications or information sharing - local communities possess a huge store of energy and goodwill to draw on - use it! They know their communities best. People are distressed and emotional; plans need to be cognisant of this. Do not shut this out and go around people because of it.

Build resiliency into the planning Recovery in all ways. This is not just a buzzword for lifelines planning but a way of thinking about restoration and regeneration to make the community stronger, and able to cope with future events better and faster.

Plan to Communicate a lot. Planning for building of capacity early is crucial, effective and on-going communications is vital, with the emphasis on effective i.e. in ways that the affected community sees as effective. This could have been in place much earlier for WDC.

Create a strong internal culture. Planning in an emergency environment requires high levels of trust throughout the organisation. This ranges from the governance roles of the elected members to the person in the digger.

Get the data. Plan to build a database of people and their circumstance. The lack of this became a major source of frustration. Planning for a better specific individual database could have been done earlier. This would have allowed a better focus on planning solutions from a position of knowledge. A national or international database of people with experience in these situations does not seem to exist – other than Google. This is an opportunity.

Plan the Recovery to kick in earlier. The transition from Response to Recovery reflected the planning that was heavy on Response and light on Recovery. This needs to be more agile especially in the social aspects. Individual streams of activity could have transitioned earlier, however this may have been delayed by the 'we are in Response and so we cannot start Recovery' mind set.

Empowerment is the key to building trust – *'clarify what my delegated authority is and then allow me to get on with the job'*. People on the ground know what is happening and should be delegated with an appropriate level of authority to act.

Take care when using volunteers. When planning to use volunteers in Social Response and Recovery ensure the plans carry an appropriate level of capability assessment. There were situations where unskilled volunteers were in entirely inappropriate roles in Response centres. Fortunately this did not cause major issues as these concerns were spotted before they could transpire. As Sandra James noted *'we don't have well-meaning volunteers fixing sewers, how come it is ok to have well-meaning volunteers fixing fragile people'*.

Rethink Emergency Management as a process that starts with Reduction and flows through to include Recovery. The planning and processes (and organisational structure) needs to be aligned to this. The Civil Defence and Emergency Management act is perhaps misnamed, the Civil Defence part of the name adds to the confusion and could be dropped (as it almost was at the time the legislation was drafted). This creates confusion and is reflected in the way the WDC operates. An old school (1983 Act Civil Defence viewpoint) element sits in one area of the council. Readiness is everywhere. Civil Defence has come to mean Readiness and Response. Reduction and Recovery seems to be elsewhere. All of these elements need to be very cohesive and the structure and pockets of thinking is a barrier to cohesiveness. John Hamilton, Director of Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, understands this well however, this was not perhaps understood by Hon. Gerry Brownlie, Canterbury Earthquake

Recovery Minister, and was a cause of conflict. It is apparent some council staff members think this and do not or choose not to challenge the status quo. This is a pragmatic response in the current environment and so is hard to criticise.

There are major annual Canterbury group Civil Defence and Emergency Management exercises called Operation Pandora. The exercises and debrief have a sole documented focus on Response. This is a perfect opportunity to wrap Recovery into the same operation and achieve a good test of plans that are in place.

One of the more important critical success factors was the creation of The Hub. The Hub was set up early on in the Recovery as a centre for all of the Recovery activities. Some improvements suggested have been:

- Push greater participation by all agencies in the Recovery
- Set it up earlier

The interviews showed the key planning lessons continue to centre on the people elements. These elements should run right through not only the planning, but also the delivery of the plans themselves.

COUNCIL ELECTED MEMBERS AND GOVERNANCE

While WDC benefits from having key elected members of the council that hold an excellent profile, the role of elected members needs some work. While the elected members role is sometimes unclear, they do maintain a very close relationship to the community they serve. David Ayers, the Mayor, has *'spent time at properties listening to barking dogs'*; Therefore, this is a very different relationship to that a board of directors' member might have with the customer. The role of the Councillor is more that of the customer service department that is voted into their job every three years based on how the money was spent and how well the customers were listened to.

The elected council membership responsible for this area were unsure of what role they should assume in the Response phase. This does not suggest they sat by idly, far from it, however the activities they undertook were perhaps better focussed on maintaining their role as 'governors' of the Response rather than on the ground.

Some refresher training and clarity on the role of elected members has been suggested by elected members as useful, every term, rather than just for new elected members. *'The assumption that just because I have been doing this for a long time I should know, is flawed.'*

The planning of the Response and Recovery was of a high standard however; to suggest this was due to an appropriate level of councillor review and monitoring would be a stretch. A key element of this is the use of an assessment tool to allow good monitoring and reporting.

One of the key challenges for elected members is to bridge the gap between accessible 'operational' elected member and the governance role. There is an opportunity to provide the elected members with a level of education around organisational performance measurement as a method to ensure elected members can satisfy themselves that things are as they should be. Using external tools such as The Baldrige Criteria for Public Organizations can help; however, in this instance the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management assessment tool seems more appropriate.

The planning cycles within council provide elected members with an opportunity to have substantial input into the plans. Past episodes such as the Manawatu floods, are woven into these plans and there is a level of cooperation and information sharing between councils.

In David Ayers view, the Response and Recovery has been excellent because of the quality and visibility of the staff.

He went on to suggest that events have moved away from the plans made by WDC reinforcing the view that a framework and organisational capability is more appropriate as events will invariably overtake the plans; particularly in a situation where external agencies have a high level of influence or, as in this case, blindside the plans put in place by the council.

One of the other challenges was the almost overwhelming influx of residents from badly damaged areas of Christchurch into Rangiora. This 'domestic immigration' from Christchurch occurred because of the February earthquake when WDC was in the thick of its own response and recovery from September's earthquake. This was unexpected but in hindsight should not have been. This is a salient lesson for other smaller councils next to large metropolitan centres.

The critical success factors from the elected members' perspective have been:

- *'A high degree of acceptance by the wider community that the needs must be addressed'*. This was important as a large cross-section of the community was not impacted by the Earthquake yet they have worn some of the economic cost and service levels have been impacted by Recovery becoming a business as unusual activity.

- The media has played a role in this to assist with key messaging to those unaffected directly.
- *'Be well connected to the community, be responsive, and doing lots of listening.'*
- *'Jim Palmer's leadership and down his team. Community attitudes strongly permeate the organisation'*. It is clear that the executive and elected members are very much in step and it is very difficult not to draw comparisons with other councils in the region.
- A united council that is, overall, very clear in its role, uses the community boards well, and the Mayor is highly accessible and clearly a strong team builder.

The major challenges faced by the WDC through planning was the 'what' and 'how' was quite clear, however, the 'who' became a challenge. The same 'go to' people were constantly targeted, and consequently, there was, and still is very real risk of burnout from a number of key personnel and not just at the senior level. As the Mayor stated *'we had the right ideas but not the resources'*.

A portfolio model of elected members' role management was introduced with the new council that was elected in October, just after the first earthquake. Roger Blair took on the Civil Defence role. This role was very focussed on Readiness and Response. That said Roger stated he had periods of uncertainty as to what he should do during the Response phase. I am sure that he was not alone in this, as everyone involved in any way through this period, had moments where the task seemed overwhelming and so doing something very basic and hands on makes it all real and tangible.

The areas of opportunity for this portfolio management include having a reporting system that clearly demonstrates the state of planning. The current feedback cycle is very informal.

In discussion with a number of Councillors it is apparent that the boundaries between governance and management are blurred and do create conflict. Some thought could be given to some clarification and training in this area. Some Councillors acknowledged that despite the longevity in these roles as elected members, there is a need to re-clarify and refresh so that everyone is on the same page.

CERA/MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT/CIVIL DEFENCE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT/HOUSING NEW ZEALAND/MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

Additional discussions were held with a number of agencies and individuals at local, regional and national level, and this information provided useful background and context to allow further development of the review of planning.

A number of these agencies recognised the value of The Hub set up and agreed with WDC personnel that it could have been earlier. Operation Pandora was also mentioned as an opportunity to focus on the Recovery elements as well as the Response components.

One of the major challenges for external agencies was the level of *'they seem to have it sorted'* perspective on the WDC. Consequently, WDC was a lower priority than other areas.

While there are plenty of proven models for minor emergencies, there is a distinct lack of planning in place for Emergency Management for significant events such as the Christchurch Earthquakes. It was also noted that the focus is very much on Response and very little pre-existed for Recovery.

It was unfortunate that this occurred during the lead up to an election as both major political parties consistently used the situation to score political points and this create a cynicism of the value provided at a Central Government level.

There were opportunities to move things forward more quickly, however areas like data sharing protocols, while they have been in development for some time, are still immature for this type of event. The Red Cross register became crucial as a dataset.

A continual thread through all of the discussions was the lack of planning funding for agencies at all levels, in all organisations. Just how much do we spend 'just in case'?

These issues were a constraint to the effectiveness of WDC as the lead agency in the Waimakariri District.

DOCUMENTATION REVIEW

WDC PRE EARTHQUAKE PLANNING DOCUMENTATION

REDUCTION

The Reduction elements of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management planning sits within the District Plan and consists of planning maps (e.g. showing flood levels), and principals, guidelines and rules that manage risks associated with natural hazards such as fire, flood, snow etc. These are based on statistical models of event likelihood and frequency.

Liquefaction associated with earthquakes has been recognised for a number of years and a detailed assessment was undertaken to attempt to quantify and manage the risks.

The risk management process extends to noting areas of risk on Land Information Memoranda (LIMs). However, it does not flow well through to the building control process, as there is not an effective linkage between the Resource Management Act elements identified in the LIM and the building defined in the Building Act elements identified in the Project Information Memoranda (PIM). The Building Act interface with the Resource Management Act is based on the good ground principals of NZS 3604.

READINESS

The Readiness phase encapsulates the plans put in place. In the case of WDC, and research suggests many other local government bodies in New Zealand, there is a primary focus on the Response phase with a much lower level of focus on the Recovery.

WDC has a number of documents that are plans, policies and procedures relevant to Emergency Management as below.

Category	Emergency Management Documents		
National Plans, Policies and Procedures	National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan	Guide to National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2006	National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy
Regional Plans, Policies and Procedures	Civil Defence Emergency Management Canterbury Group Plan		
Local Plans, Policies and Procedures	CDEM Sector Post Operational Handbook	District Disaster Recovery Plan	District Emergency Welfare Plan
	District Pandemic Influenza Business Continuity Plan	District Pandemic Community Support Plan	District Plan
	Emergency Operations Centre Standard Operating Procedures	Local Civil Defence Emergency Management Arrangements	Ten Year Plan
	NZRT-12 Governing Document	NZRT-12 Standard Operating Procedures	Waikuku Beach Community Emergency Response Team Plan

WDC has extensive local arrangements in place, along with standard operational procedures in the event of a local, regional or national declaration of a state of emergency.

As an example of the level of detail, below is the table of the contents for the Local Civil Defence Emergency Management Arrangements. This document is just one of a series of documents primarily focused on the Emergency Response.

Section	Sub-Sections		
Introduction			
The District	Description		
Local Hazard scape	Definition	Group Hazard Register Summary	District Plan (RMA)
	Earthquake	Flooding	Tsunami
	Storms	High Winds	Wild Fires
	Human Induced Disasters	All Hazard Approach	
District CDEM Organisational Structure	Response to Major Incidents and Emergencies	CDEM District Liaison Committee	Local Controller and Alternates
	Appointment of representative to the Canterbury CDEM Group		
Warning System	Introduction	Public Warnings System	Tsunami Warning Systems
	Responsibility for issuing public warnings		
Declarations	Declarations Guidelines	Persons authorised to declare a Civil Defence Emergency	Process to increase the Area covered by a Declaration
	Process to decrease the Area covered by a Declaration		
Emergency Operations Centre	Introduction	Incident Management Structure	Location of Local Emergency Operations Centre
	Relationship with adjacent Territorial Authorities/ Group Emergency Coordination Centre	Integration/Liaison with Emergency Services and other Organisations	Standard Operating Procedures
Communications	Introduction		
Public Information & Media Liaison	Introduction	Appointment of Public Information/Media relations Officer	News Media Liaison
	Community Awareness and Education	Authority for Issuing Information	

Section	Sub-Sections		
Welfare	Introduction	Role of Civil Defence Emergency Management in Welfare	Roles of Government Departments
	Welfare Manager	District Welfare Plan	Welfare Management Committee
	Welfare Centres	Location	Mobile Welfare Units
	Local Welfare Structure		
Finance	Financial Delegation	Finance outside an emergency	Expenditure incurred during an emergency
	District Insurance Policy	Claims	
Rescue	Introduction	District Rescue Manager	Team Structure
	Organisation	Rescue Teams	National Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Resources
Disaster Recovery	Introduction	Function	Appointment of a Disaster Recovery Manager
	Relationship between Disaster Recovery Manager and Local Controller's	Location of Disaster Recovery Coordination Office	Disaster Recovery finances / financial policies
Partner Agencies	Introduction	Integration with Partner Agencies	NZ Police
	Rural Fire	Police Liaison	NZ Fire Service
Health	Communications	Mortuary Facilities	Public Health
	Registration of Casualties	Support Services	
Distribution List			

While this document has elements of Recovery, it is short on detail and is out of date.

My recommendation is WDC would be better served to remove Recovery from this document and have a cross reference to the more detailed Recovery plan.

RESPONSE

While the Pre earthquake planning documentation for the Response phase was quite detailed, like the Recovery planning, it has not been formally assessed other than by implementation, which could arguably be the best test. The planning for the Response phase is a component of the Readiness element.

While WDC had a formal Recovery Plan in place, this has not been used as a Recovery tool by WDC. In fact, several senior staff members were not aware of its existence.

That said, the documented plan was 'followed' with some exceptions. I would go as far as suggesting that this is due to the plan being so generic in nature or so obvious in its high level content.

This document was created in conjunction with the other councils in the local Civil Defence group and is virtually identical to the plans at the Timaru, Ashburton, Selwyn, Hurunui, Christchurch and Kaikoura Councils. A table of the contents is as follows:

Section	Subsections		
Recovery Management In Preparing For An Event	Introduction	Recovery Priorities	Recovery Management & Coordination Roles, Organisational Structure
Recovery Management During And After An Event	Transition From Response	Recovery Management Office	Recovery Manager's Key Tasks And Responsibilities
	Co-Ordination Of Government Agencies, Community Groups, And Other	Resources	Reporting
	Impact Assessment	Financial Management	Management Of Aid
	Government Subsidised Employment Schemes	Public Information And Communication	Managed Withdrawal
Appendices	Appointments	Task Group Membership	Group Recovery Manager Terms Of Reference
	Needs Assessment Form	Recovery Action Plan	Public Information and Communication
	Further Background Information on Sections of the CDEM Group Recovery Plan		

The other important consideration of Recovery planning is that despite many emergencies in New Zealand, from when the Act was legislated in 2002 until the 2005 landslides in Matata in the Bay of Plenty, no emergency had gone through a lifecycle that had ever required any detailed planned Recovery process. The emergency had tended to go from Response to Business-as-usual with no, or very low-level Recovery efforts. Therefore, consequently the Recovery plan may only ever have been seen as a compliance activity rather than a practical working document.

WDC POST-EARTHQUAKE PLANNING DOCUMENTATION

There has been substantial Recovery planning work following the Earthquakes. It is at such a high level that the Recovery planning since has consumed very high levels of resources to the point that earthquake Recovery could almost be viewed as the new norm. I have reviewed a not insignificant sample of this, many reams, and can only concur with Future Canterbury Network's statement praising the planning by WDC since. Future Canterbury Network rated WDC as 2.5 where a score of 2.0 meets expectations and 3.0 exceeds expectations. That said, there has been a significant challenge, in that the target has moved significantly for WDC.

'Planning is in a bit of a cusp area. There are two main issues: what to do about the red zone once people leave; and evolving a plan for provision of land for people to build on.'
WDC receives a rating that reflects the uncertainty of the position many of its residents in the earthquake-impacted areas (Kaiapoi, Kairaki and Pines Beach) are in and a degree of uncertainty among Council staff.
Evidence presented to the Assessment Panel shows planning is problematic in a situation where there had been a full risk identification and mitigation plan put in place for the Kaiapoi rebuild until *'the government pulled the plug'*. Meaning that while the Council was previously able to take strong ownership of implementing plans for Recovery it is now much more up in the air and uncertain about the future.
'CERA is now involved in this district in a way which it wasn't before. Which means we are busy forming a relationship with CERA and engaged in a process of willing engagement.'
WDC planning and implementation processes have worked well because of an ability to rely strongly on relationships between managers and the trust they have for each other. The size of the organisation has made this outcome more achievable than may be possible in larger organisations.
Economic expectations of the Recovery plan have been hardest to fulfil and are likely to remain problematic. How to address these is a significant issue for the future – particularly if confidence in the future is to be maintained. Some capital projects have been pushed out because of economic viability and timing issues.

Future Canterbury Network Earthquake Recovery Accountability Scorecard Report Waimakariri District Council

21 September 2011 Future Canterbury Network

The underlying principal of good communication has ensured that any planning has been widely consulted and has ensured a high level of acceptance and buy in from the community. This has created a highly engaged community. The issue recognised above in the Future Canterbury Network assessment has had a severe impact on the WDC brand as planning, and execution has been taken out of their hands, and consequently, WDC is now starting to be viewed with the same scepticism as CERA and other agencies.

OTHER AGENCIES INFLUENCING LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

There are a number of government and non-government organisations that are influencers in both the emergency Response and Recovery phases. These agencies included CERA, Future Canterbury Network, Group Civil Defence and the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.

An interesting development in the Emergency Management Landscape has been the creation of an organisation called Future Canterbury Network.

CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY AUTHORITY (CERA)

CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE AND RECOVERY ACT 2010

This was repealed and replaced by Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011. The government agency setup Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission, was also disassembled before it had even really achieved anything. A small number of staff from the Commission moved to CERA.

CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY ACT 2011 AND CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY AUTHORITY (CERA)

The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 commenced on 19 April 2011.

The Act provides a range of powers to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery (Honourable Gerry Brownlee) and the new state entity, Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), 'to provide appropriate measures to ensure that greater Christchurch and the councils and their communities respond to, and recover from, the impacts of the Canterbury earthquakes'.

The Act envisages that this will be achieved in a number of ways.

Initially, CERA will develop a Recovery Strategy in consultation with key stakeholders including:

- Christchurch City Council (CCC)
- Environment Canterbury (ECan)
- WDC
- Selwyn District Council
- Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu
- 'Any other persons or organisations that the Minister considers appropriate'

The Recovery Strategy will act as an overarching, long-term strategy, setting the overall direction for the Recovery and should target the following:

- The areas where rebuilding or other redevelopment may or may not occur, and the sequencing of these activities
- The location of existing and future infrastructure and the possible sequencing of repairs, rebuilding, and reconstructions
- The style and purpose of the Recovery Plans to be developed and the relationship between the plans
- Any additional matters to be addressed in particular Recovery Plans, including who should lead the development of the Plans

A draft Recovery Strategy under the Act must be developed by the 18th January 2012, and must be publicly notified. Further, at least one public hearing must be held where members of the public can appear and make submissions.

A number of Recovery Plans will sit under the Recovery Strategy, providing the detail of what is to be done and how it will be implemented. These Recovery Plans must be consistent with the Recovery Strategy and can cover any social, economic, cultural or environmental matter, and any particular infrastructure, work or activity on a site-specific or wider geographic basis within greater Christchurch.

The Act does not provide mandatory public consultation requirements in relation to the development of other Recovery Plans, unlike the Recovery Strategy. The Act allows the Minister to determine the requirements for public consultation.

Recovery Plans will be 'woven into' statutory plans (including plans under a variety of Acts including the Resource Management Act and Local Government Act) and prevail where inconsistent. This will enable Recovery Plans to take immediate legal effect from date the Plan is approved or from the date specified within the relevant Plan.

A Council can also be directed by a Recovery Plan to amend proposed regional policy statements, proposed plans and plans and to make the required amendments, in some instances, without public consultation. This takes precedence over the district planning processes required under the Local Government Act. This opens further opportunity for WDC to be blindsided by CERA as has previously occurred.

Furthermore, a Council must not make a decision or recommendation that is inconsistent with a Recovery Plan.

These powers are very powerful; they must be used so that ECan, WDC and Christchurch City Council (CCC) do not hide behind the Local Government Act or Resource Management Act to prevent communities moving forward.

STATUTORY POWERS

These broad powers under the Act, either given to the Minister or delegated to the Chief Executive of CERA, include the power to:

- Obtain or require information from any source
- Enter onto land, remove fixtures and fittings, perform work on land, construct structures, and register its interest in those structures
- Close roads and divert traffic
- Enter and remove, including demolition powers
- Require land to be temporarily vacated so work can be coordinated (which may involve demolition)
- Compulsorily acquire land
- Approve certain council or organisation contracts, over a certain threshold, if necessary
- Suspend, amend or revoke any council plans and policies
- Suspend or cancel resource consents

COMPENSATION

Compensation is available where land is compulsorily acquired and in respect of some building demolition. This acquisition is loosely based on and parallels some of the principals in the Public Works Act 1981. There are however some key differences that will undoubtedly create issues and as such where land is compulsorily acquired, the Act makes specific provision for compensation to be determined having less regard to the land's current market value than the Public Works Act.

The Crown does not however need to compensate owners or tenants of dangerous buildings that are demolished. Further to this, the Crown may recover the cost of demolition from the owner.

Where a non-dangerous building is demolished in order to demolish a dangerous building or for any other reason, the Crown must compensate the owner of the non-dangerous building for the loss.

No compensation is payable under the Act for the suspension, amendment or revocation of council plan and policies, or suspension or cancellation of any resource consents. This could have the effect of slowing down or constraining Recovery plans due to the potential risks involved.

Where compensation may be payable, a claim must be lodged within two years. The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Minister is the sole arbiter of whether compensation is payable and the amount of compensation to be paid.

Compensation is payable based on actual loss and the Act excludes some items that are excluded from the right to compensation. They include any part of a loss that is insured, economic or consequential loss, business interruption and, 'any other matter which the Minister reasonably considers is unwarranted or unjustified'.

CHECKS AND BALANCES

Within the Act, there is provision for checks and balances on the various specific powers provided to the Minister and CERA. The primary check is the requirement for the exercise of powers to be for the specified purpose of the Act and only where it is considered reasonably necessary.

The Minister is required to:

- Appoint a 'community forum', made up of at least 20 persons, for providing information and advice to the Minister; this forum now contains 38 members and in the words of one member 'is virtually impotent due to its unwieldy size'
- Arrange for a cross-party parliamentary forum to provide information and advice to the Minister
- Every three months present a report on the operation of the Act to the House, which must include a description of the powers exercised under the Act during that period

Additionally, the right to seek judicial review will apply to the decisions of the Minister and CERA.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL

The Governor-General is permitted to make Orders in Council on the recommendation of the Minister to exempt, modify or extend any provisions of any enactment for the purpose of the Act.

A Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Review Panel has been established under the Act to review draft Orders in Council.

Appointments to the Panel are:

- Sir John Hansen, a former High Court Judge
- Dame Jenny Shipley, former Prime Minister
- Anneke Goodall, Former CEO of Ngai Tahu Holdings
- Murray Sherwin, Former Chair of Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission, the now defunct predecessor to CERA

The Minister is required to carefully consider the Panel's recommendations and must consult with the cross-party forum.

APPEAL RIGHTS

The Act expressly limits rights of appeal that might otherwise apply, such that appeals are only available to the High Court in specified circumstances, e.g. in a matter of compensation.

Decisions made by the High Court are appealable to the Court of Appeal.

CONCLUSION

The Act has potentially significant implications particularly in respect of the Resource Management Act. The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 and The Authority (CERA) have a life span of five years. The Act includes a number of checks and balances, but also wide-ranging powers. It remains to be seen how these powers will be used. To paraphrase a former reserve bank governor in relation to statutory powers, *'there is no point parading up and down with a shotgun if you don't demonstrate you are prepared to use it'*.

The Act does reflect the need for timely and effective decision-making powers while acknowledging that the people of Canterbury have a right to a say in how their communities should be rebuilt, however the measure of success will be the outcomes achieved.

One of the biggest challenges is that over one year after the first earthquake, the Authority is still gearing up its management team with at least two senior members not starting their roles until October.

FUTURE CANTERBURY NETWORK (FUTURE CANTERBURY NETWORK)

This excerpt from its website describes its Statement of Intent:

> *"Future Canterbury Network has been established by senior members of Christchurch business and community organisations*
>
> *Future Canterbury Network is very conscious of the multiple organisations that are, formally and informally, contributing to the policy formation that is mandated to CERA*
>
> *Future Canterbury Network believes it is important to have an independent body of appropriate people, who collectively have a major stake in the city, who can constructively monitor and peer review the processes and decisions that will now become the responsibly of CERA*
>
> *Future Canterbury Network is deeply conscious of the need for innovative and significant decision making by CERA on the one hand, and the capacity for procrastination by analysis that characterised the lack of progress following the September earthquake*
>
> *The membership of Future Canterbury Network is deliberately designed to include specialist expertise and experience at every level of appropriate concern in the 'rebuild of Christchurch'*

Future Canterbury Network is determined to provide an informed and constructive analysis of decisions that must now be made to achieve an effective rebuild of the city"

The Future Canterbury Network has used an accountability tool to measure the success of a number of agencies involved in the Recovery, including WDC. There has been speculation that the group's goal is to change the behaviour of Christchurch City Council by using the high performing WDC as an example of good practice.

The outcome of this analysis has been very complimentary of WDC's performance in the majority of areas. In particular, the planning elements are of note:

Element	Score
Leadership	2.88
Shared Vision	2.93
Aspirational Strategy	3.04
Governance	2.12
Community Engagement	2.93
Robust Plans	2.50
Informed regulation	1.78
Infrastructure Management	2.88
Human Resources	1.99

Key to Scores

0 = Not Achieved

1 = Work in Progress

2 = Reasonable Expectations Achieved

3 = Expectations Exceeded

CIVIL DEFENCE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT /THE MINISTRY OF CIVIL DEFENCE/THE CIVIL DEFENCE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACT 2002

'Civil Defence' in New Zealand is structured as a multi-layered inter-agency structure. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management is accountable for ensuring the legislation is adhered to and providing non-financial support to the virtual organisation that makes up the Civil Defence and Emergency Management framework. It is not a funding agency and the organisations that make up the framework must fund their Civil Defence and Emergency Management activities from internal funding. In the case of councils, this means funding must come from its general rates.

The 2002 Act requires organisational arrangements for Civil Defence and Emergency Management, incorporating:

- Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group comprising elected representatives of the constituent local authorities formed as a joint standing committee within six months post-commencement of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002
- A Coordinating Executive Group (CEG) comprising chief executive officers of the constituent local authorities plus senior members of the emergency services
- Group and Local Controllers to direct and coordinate Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group resources during declared emergencies
- An appropriate body of trained and competent personnel, organisational structure and process arrangements to ensure Civil Defence and Emergency Management delivery to communities.

The Ministry suggests that mechanisms to achieve effective Civil Defence and Emergency Management Groups will include:

- A Civil Defence and Emergency Management office to provide professional hazard management and planning services to the Group
- Emergency Operations Centres (EOC)
- Recovery Managers.

NZ has a very strong Emergency Management planning framework. This is laid out in the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 replaces the Civil Defence Act 1983. With this change, there was a significant move of emphasis from Civil Defence to a holistic Emergency Management. This shift in thinking in the 2002 Act has not flowed through in practice. As a glaring example, the last major Civil Defence Emergency Management exercise in Canterbury that tested an Earthquake scenario (Operation Pegasus) had no elements related to Recovery despite it being two years after the new Act. John Hamilton of the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management says this must change.

The new Act:

- promotes sustainable management of hazards
- encourages and enables communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk
- provides for planning and preparation for emergencies, and for Response and Recovery
- requires local authorities to coordinate planning and activities

- provides a basis for the integration of national and local Civil Defence
- Emergency Management encourages coordination across a wide range of agencies, recognising that emergencies are multi-agency events

The Act requires that a risk management approach be taken when dealing with hazards. In considering the risks associated with a particular hazard, both the likelihood of the event occurring and its consequences must be considered. As part of the comprehensive approach to Civil Defence Emergency Management, all hazards, not only natural hazards, must be taken into consideration.

The primary goal for communities is to be self-reliant. Communities should aim to reduce the likely impact from, prepare for, and be able to respond effectively to, emergency events on their own. To encourage this, regional cooperation and coordination are paramount and form one of the cornerstones of the Act.

In addition, whole of community participation is key. All sectors with an interest in Civil Defence Emergency Management are accountable for ensuring that their communities are aware of, and committed to, effective Civil Defence Emergency Management.

The 2002 Act calls for an Emergency Management strategy. This Strategy lays out the four 'R's of Emergency Management Resilience as follows:

Reduction	Identifying and analysing long-term risks to human life and property from natural or man-made hazards; taking steps to eliminate these risks where practicable and, where not, reducing the likelihood and the magnitude of their impact.
Readiness	Developing operational systems and capabilities before an emergency happens. These include self-help and response programmes for the public, as well as specific programmes for emergency services, utilities, and other agencies.
Response	Actions taken immediately before, during or directly after an emergency, to save lives and property, as well as help communities to recover.
Recovery	The co-ordinated efforts and processes used to bring about the immediate, medium-term, and long-term holistic regeneration of a community following a civil defence emergency.

The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management is a key influencer in both the emergency Response and Recovery phases. However, the perception was the Earthquake Recovery Minister saw their role as being in the former only i.e. Response. This is an important point, under the Civil Defence and Emergency Management legislation, Civil Defence has wide reaching roles in the Recovery phase yet the Minister excluded the Civil Defence and Emergency Management organisation from this process. The Director (in his role as National Controller assumed during a state of National Emergency), John Hamilton, was hampered in connecting the Response and Recovery elements as he was removed from influencing the Recovery phase despite a legislated requirement to lead this while under a state of National Emergency. This needs to be rectified. The responsibilities of the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management are clear; in this situation; this was largely ignored.

This is so ingrained, that even Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Managements own documentation shies away from the Recovery piece, in as much as the national Civil Defence and Emergency Management guide published by Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management makes no reference (apart from the table reproduced above) to Recovery in the introduction as per the excerpt below:

1.4 Purpose of the National Civil Defence and Emergency Management Plan

Part 2 Purpose, objectives, and scope of plan

4 Purpose of plan

The purpose of this plan is to

a) *State the hazards and risks to be managed at the national level; and*

b) *Provide for the civil defence emergency management arrangements to meet those hazards and risks.*

1.5 Objectives of the National Civil Defence and Emergency Management Plan

5 Objectives of plan

1. *The first objective of this plan is to provide for effective management of states of national emergency or civil defence emergencies of national significance through a planned and co-ordinated whole-of-government response.*

2. *The second objective of this plan is to provide for effective Recovery from states of national emergency and civil defence emergencies of*

national significance through a planned and co-ordinated whole-of-government response.

3.   *The third objective of this plan is to provide for effective management of national support in states of local emergency through a planned and coordinated whole-of-government response.*

The Guide, as a whole, aims to support this purpose and these objectives.

CIVIL DEFENCE AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT TOOL

The Civil Defence and Emergency Management Capability Assessment Tool follows international examples such as the UK 'National Capabilities Survey', or the US 'Capability Assessment for Readiness', in aiming to create a standard assessment of Emergency Management capability for New Zealand.

The tool consists of a set of key performance indicators and performance measures ('capability criteria') against which organisations can assess themselves or be externally assessed. Indicators span the Emergency Management lifecycle from Reduction to Recovery and are organised in a framework based on the National Civil Defence and Emergency Management Strategy.

The assessment tool is intended first and foremost to be an 'any-time' self-assessment tool that any agency or Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group can use to evaluate their own capability. It could support a periodic national assessment cycle in which all agencies with responsibilities under the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act will be asked to complete assessments to document and understand New Zealand's collective Civil Defence and Emergency Management capability.

The Excel version of the assessment tool is designed as an interim measure; the intent is to develop a dedicated web-based evaluation 'portal' where organisations can log in and conduct self-assessments, as and when needed. The web version would allow substantially more flexibility in how and when assessments are conducted. It would also allow for automation of results and reporting, and automatic collation of results across a Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group area, or nationally. This will drive benchmarking and so 'shame' Civil Defence and Emergency Management organisations across the country to get to standard.

With the web-based version of the tool, you would also be able to:

- format assessments according to your needs and priorities
- track your results and progress over time
- display your results in a variety of formats
- submit assessments to Group-wide and/or national assessments
- print checklists, with relevant references and documentation cited

The web portal would be for all of New Zealand Civil Defence and Emergency Management to use. This web tool has yet to be delivered and has been on the drawing board for some time.

In the Recovery planning section, the measures are quite comprehensive and may need to be reviewed for application. The checklist is attached, as appendix A. WDC's Recovery plan would not meet a number of areas as a pass mark. The primary reason is the dislocation between Recovery and Response accountabilities. The reasons for this are varied and include that the WDC Recovery Manager had been appointed only a matter of days prior to the first earthquake. This creates a vacuum of ownership as the plan had been created by the Emergency Management team and did not transition to the wider Recovery team responsibility.

Below is a screen shot of the Recovery summary page of the excel version of the tool that provides an excellent snapshot of the Recovery plan status as described as best practice by Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.

This then rolls up to give a high level view of the total Emergency Management plans

RECOMMENDATIONS

While the WDC has shown outstanding performance despite the curve balls thrown at it by Mother Nature and central government, there are several recommendations for WDC:

- Use the Civil Defence Capability Assessment Tool. This will ensure:
    - structures, roles and responsibilities for Recovery are pre-determined and documented
    - Recovery Management organisation is identified, trained, supported and ready to perform the role
    - Recovery Plan outlines arrangements for holistic Recovery management
    - Recovery planning is integrated with risk reduction and other community planning
    - arrangements for the transition from Response to Recovery are pre-defined
    - provide the Councillors with this portfolio to ascertain the Readiness at a glance

- Take a holistic approach to Emergency Management. In light of this:
    - review internal responsibility for emergency management and associated organisational structure
    - get Recovery included into Operation Pandora (the annual Civil Defence exercises)

- Define the governance roles in relation to Emergency Management
    - define the roles
    - implement the Civil Defence Capability Assessment Tool for monitoring purposes
    - ensure training is implemented

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study was completed with the support and assistance of the management and elected representatives of WDC and I thank them for their assistance and cooperation. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Jim Palmer CEO, David Ayers Mayor and Simon Markham Recovery Manager for access to people, documentation and the willingness to talk.

I would also like to thank my wife Gaye for her patience, willingness to learn too much on this topic, and for pointing out all my, grammatical, errors.

APPENDIX A CIVIL DEFENCE AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT TOOL

Strategy				Capability Criteria		
	Objective	#	KPI	#	Performance Measures	
A	Implement effective recovery planning activities	1	Structures, roles and responsibilities for recovery are pre-determined and documented	1	Role, responsibilities and structures for a Recovery Office are defined	
				2	Process, procedures and likely tasks for a Recovery Office are documented	
				3	Role, representative agencies and likely tasks for a social environment task group are defined	
				4	Agencies involved in the social environment task group are aware of, understand and accept their role and responsibilities in the task group	
				5	Role, representative agencies and likely tasks for a built environment task group are defined	
				6	Agencies involved in the built environment task group are aware of, understand and accept their role and responsibilities in the task group	
				7	Role, representative agencies and likely tasks for a natural environment task group are defined	
				8	Agencies involved in the natural environment task group are aware of, understand and accept their role and responsibilities in the task group	
				9	Role, representative agencies and likely tasks for an economic environment task group are defined	
				10	Agencies involved in the economic environment task group are aware of, understand and accept their role and responsibilities in the task group	

Strategy		Capability Criteria			
#	Objective	#	KPI	#	Performance Measures
A	Implement effective recovery planning activities	2	Recovery Managers are identified, trained, supported and ready to perform the role	1	The Recovery Manager role is defined (by terms of reference or job/role description that includes expected responsibilities and functions)
				2	There is a formal/documented process for the selection and appointment of Recovery Managers
				3	An appropriately qualified Recovery Manager, and alternate(s), is identified and formally appointed
				4	Recovery Managers have a good working knowledge of the organisation's Civil Defence and Emergency Management roles and responsibilities, plans and procedures
				5	There is a programme of Civil Defence and Emergency Management professional development for Recovery Managers
				6	Recovery Managers have participated in a Civil Defence and Emergency Management exercise in the last 2 years
				7	Recovery Managers have been delegated the power to make decisions and commit financial resources
				8	Recovery Managers have the confidence to act, to the same degree as Controllers
				9	Group and local recovery managers have frequent opportunities to interact (in 'peace time')

Strategy		Capability Criteria			
#	Objective	#	KPI	#	Performance Measures
A	Implement effective recovery planning activities	3	Recovery Plan outlines arrangements for holistic recovery management	1	Principles of recovery are defined
				2	The structure for recovery is outlined
				3	Likely functional activities in the post-event period are identified
				4	Management arrangements for each functional activity are described
				5	Plan sets out the expectations (roles and responsibilities) of each partner agency
				6	Plan sets out public information requirements of the recovery period, how stakeholders will be managed, and lists pre-defined key messages
				7	Plan includes a template for a Recovery Action Plan
				8	Plan includes an Exit Strategy that describes principles, roles and responsibilities, and systematic arrangements for the withdrawal of formal recovery assistance
				9	Recovery Plan demonstrates alignment with and links to the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group plan
				10	Recovery plan has been exercised within the last 3 years

Strategy		Capability Criteria			
#	Objective	#	KPI	#	Performance Measures
B	Enhance the ability of agencies to manage the recovery process	1	Impact assessments are conducted before, during and after events in order to inform recovery planning and management	1	Organisation has a standard approach to impact assessment that transitions smoothly from the pre-event period to the response to the recovery phases, enabling comparisons of impact at various times through the event
				2	Pre-event vulnerability assessments are effective in informing likely consequences of impacts and likely recovery needs
				3	There is a clear plan in place for how, where, and what types of information will be collected during and after an event
				4	There is a process for collecting or estimating numbers, locations, circumstances and ethnicity of displaced and/or injured people
				5	There is a process for conducting needs assessments or acquiring needs assessment data (defining individual and community needs, support and resource requirements, etc.)
				6	There is a process for assessing and coordinating the status of lifeline utilities
				7	There is a process for estimating or obtaining economic losses

Strategy		Capability Criteria			
#	Objective	#	KPI	#	Performance Measures
B	Enhance the ability of agencies to manage the recovery process	2	Plans and procedures for establishing a recovery centre or 'one-stop shop' are in place	1	Agencies involved in a recovery centre are identified and involved in planning arrangements
				2	Possible sites for recovery centres are pre-identified; logistical requirements are considered (capacity, power, sewage, water, communications, catering, access etc.)
				3	Staffing of recovery centres has been considered; likely sources of staff have been identified
				4	A checklist or procedure for establishing a recovery centre is documented
				5	Mechanisms for advertising of recovery centres are defined
		3	The community is an integral part of recovery planning and management	1	Principles for community engagement in recovery management and a community engagement process is defined and documented
				2	Links with community groups and existing networks are pre-established (e.g. Maori community groups and trusts, civic, faith-based, social service, and/or special interest groups); champions and likely leaders for recovery are identified
				3	The Emergency Management planning process is structured so that it is open to, and encourages community participation
				4	Likely roles, functions and tasks for community groups are defined (e.g. local recovery committees)
				5	There is a strategy and pre-determined mechanisms for sharing information and reporting progress to the community in the event of a recovery operation (e.g. local newsletters, community briefings)
				6	There are strategies in place to reach vulnerable and/or special interest or marginal groups within the community

Strategy		Capability Criteria			
#	Objective	#	KPI	#	Performance Measures
B	Enhance the ability of agencies to manage the recovery process	4	Information management systems are effective in supporting recovery management	1	Information management systems that will be used during recovery are pre-identified; have measures in place to ensure they are resilient to disruptions (linked to business continuity plan)
				2	There are information management systems in place to support impact assessments, and track recovery assistance needed
				3	Staff who will be involved in recovery are familiar with the information management systems; systems have been tested in exercises
				4	There is a reporting structure in place to report recovery activities and progress towards goals
		5	Processes for learning from emergencies are embedded in the organisation	1	Organisation has an established method for, and holds timely organisational debriefs following emergencies
				2	Organisation conducts formal reviews following emergencies (of the response to and recovery from the event, and of the effectiveness of their plans)
				3	Organisation ensures debriefs and reviews are multi-agency in nature
				4	Corrective actions including professional development needs are identified and implemented following emergencies
				5	Staff involved in responding to emergencies are offered a range of support services following the event